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Abstract. Runtime monitoring is commonly used to detect the violation of desired properties in
safety critical cyber-physical systems by observing its executions. Bauer et al. introduced an influential
framework for monitoring Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) properties based on a three-valued semantics:
the formula is already satisfied by the given prefix, it is already violated, or it is still undetermined,
i.e., it can still be satisfied and violated by appropriate extensions. However, a wide range of formulas
are not monitorable under this approach, meaning that they have a prefix for which satisfaction and
violation will always remain undetermined no matter how it is extended. In particular, Bauer et al.
report that 44% of the formulas they consider in their experiments fall into this category.
Recently, a robust semantics for LTL was introduced to capture different degrees by which a property
can be violated. In this paper we introduce a robust semantics for finite strings and show its potential in
monitoring: every formula considered by Bauer et al. is monitorable under our approach. Furthermore,
we discuss which properties that come naturally in LTL monitoring — such as the realizability of all
truth values — can be transferred to the robust setting. Lastly, we show that LTL formulas with robust
semantics can be monitored by deterministic automata and report on a prototype implementation.
1 Introduction
Runtime monitoring is nowadays routinely used to assess the satisfaction of properties of systems during
their execution. To this end, a monitor, a finite-state device that runs in parallel to the system during
deployment, evaluates it with respect to a fixed property. This is especially useful for systems that cannot
be verified prior to deployment and, for this reason, can contain hidden bugs. While it is useful to catch
and document these bugs during an execution of a system, we find that the current approach to runtime
verification based on Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [13] is not sufficiently informative, especially in what
regards a system’s robustness. Imagine that we are monitoring a property ϕ and that this property is violated
during an execution. In addition to be alerted to the presence of a bug, there are several other questions
we would like to have answered such as: Although ϕ was falsified, was there a weaker version of ϕ that was
still satisfied or did the system fail catastrophically? Similarly, if we consider a property of the form ϕ→ ψ,
where ϕ is an environment assumption and ψ is a system guarantee, and the environment violates ϕ slightly
along an execution can we still guarantee that ψ is only slightly violated?
Answering these questions requires a logical formalism for specifying properties that provides meaning
to terms such as weaker and slightly. Formalizing these notions within temporal logic, so as to be able to
reason about the robustness of a system, was the main impetus behind the definition of robust Linear-time
Temporal Logic (rLTL) [51]. While reasoning in LTL yields a binary result, rLTL adopts a five-valued semantics
representing different shades of violation. Consider, for example, the specification a→ b requiring that b
is always satisfied provided a is always satisfied. In LTL, if the premise a is violated in a single position of the
trace, then the specification is satisfied vacuously, eliminating all requirements on the system regarding b. In
this case, rLTL detects a mild violation of the premise and thus allows for a mild violation of the conclusion.
While recent work covers the synthesis [51] and verification problem [5,6,51] for rLTL, the runtime
verification problem is yet to be addressed. Since runtime verification can only rely on finite traces by its
nature, interesting theoretical questions open up for rLTL with finite semantics. On the practical side, the
very same reasons that make runtime verification for LTL so useful also motivate the need for developing
the framework proposed in this paper for rLTL runtime verification. To this end, we tackle the problem of
evaluating a property over infinite traces based on a finite prefix similarly to Bauer et al. [13]. If the available
information is insufficient to declare a specification violated or satisfied, the monitor reports a ?. This concept
is applied to each degree of violation of the rLTL semantics. Thus, the rLTL monitor’s verdict consists of
four three-valued bits, as the rLTL semantics is based on four two-valued bits. Each bit represents a degree
of violation of the specification in increasing order of severity.
As an example, consider an autonomous drone that may or may not be in a stable state7. The specification
requires that it remains stable throughout the entire mission. However, if the take-off is shaky due to bad
weather, the drone is unstable for the first couple of minutes. An LTL monitor thus jumps to the conclusion
that the specification is violated whereas an rLTL monitor only reports a partial violation. As soon as the
drone stabilizes, the LTL monitor does not indicate any improvement while the rLTL monitor refines its
verdict to also report a partial satisfaction.
Some interesting properties that come naturally with LTL monitoring cannot be seamlessly lifted to
rLTL monitoring. While it is obvious that all three truth values for finite trace LTL, i.e., satisfied, violated,
and unknown, can be realized for some prefix and formula, the same does not hold for rLTL. Intuitively,
the second and third bit of the rLTL monitor’s four-bit output for the property a represent whether a
eventually hold forever or whether it holds infinitely often, respectively. Based on a prefix, a monitor cannot
distinguish between these two shades of violation, rendering some monitor outputs unrealizable.
In addition to that, we investigate how the level of informedness of an LTL monitor relates to the one of
an rLTL monitor. The first observation is that a verdict of an LTL monitor can be refined at most once, from
an unknown to either true or false. With rLTL semantics, however, a monitor can refine its output for a given
formula up to four times. Secondly, an LTL monitor can only deliver meaningful verdicts for monitorable [12]
properties. Intuitively, a property is monitorable if every prefix can be extended by a finite continuation
that gives a definite verdict. We adapt the definition to robust monitoring and show that neither does LTL
monitorability imply rLTL monitorability, nor vice versa.
Notwithstanding the above, empirical data suggests that rLTL monitoring indeed provides more information
than LTL monitoring: This paper presents an algorithm synthesizing monitors for rLTL specifications. An
implementation thereof allows us to validate the approach by replicating the experiments of Bauer et al. [12].
As performance metric, we use LTL and rLTL monitorability. They showed that 44% of their formulas are not
LTL-monitorable whereas we show all of them to be rLTL-monitorable. This indicates that rLTL monitoring
is an improvement over LTL monitoring in terms of monitorability and complements the theoretical results
with a practical validation.
The main research contributions of this paper are thus a finite trace semantics for rLTL coupled with
an investigation of its properties when compared to LTL, as well as an algorithm to synthesize monitors for
rLTL specifications. The construction is doubly-exponential in the size of the formula, so rLTL monitoring is
no more costly than LTL monitoring.
Proofs and detailed results of the experimental evaluation omitted due to space constraints can be found
in the appendix.
Related Work In runtime verification [19,31,38,44] the specification is often given in LTL [42]. While properties
arguing about the past or current state of a system are always monitorable [30], LTL can also express
assumptions on the future that cannot be validated using only a finite prefix of a word. Thus, adaptations of
LTL have been proposed which include different notions of a next step on finite words [21,41], lifting LTL to
a three- or four-valued domain [12,13], or applying predictive measures to rule out impossible extensions of
words [53].
7 By this we mean, e.g., that the error in tracking a desired trajectory is below a certain threshold.
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Non-binary monitoring has also been addressed by adding quantitative measures such as counting
events [8,43]. Most notably, Bartocci et al. [9] evaluate the “likelihood” that a satisfying or violating continuation
will occur. To this end, for a given prefix, they count how long a continuation needs to be such that the
specification is satisfied/violated; these numbers are then compared against each other. The resulting verdict
is quinary: satisfying/violating, presumably satisfying/violating, or inconclusive. This approach is similar
in nature to our work as it assesses the degree of satisfaction or violation of a given prefix. However, the
motivation and niche of both approaches differs: Bartocci et al.’s approach computes — intuitively speaking
— the amount of work that is required to satisfy or violate a specification, which allows for estimating the
likelihood of satisfaction. Our approach, however, focusses on measuring to what an extend a specification
was satisfied or violated.
Apart from that, monitoring tools collecting statistics [1,4,26] become increasingly popular: Snort [48] is
a commercial tool for rule-based network monitoring and computing efficient statistics, Beep Beep 3 [29]
is a tool based on a query language allowing for powerful aggregation functions and statistical measures.
On the downside, it imposes the overhead of running a heavy-weight application on the monitored system.
In contrast, we generate monitor automata out of an rLTL formula. Such an automaton can easily and
automatically be implemented on almost any system with statically determined memory requirements and
negligible performance overhead. Similarly, the Copilot [45] framework based on synchronous languages [15,16]
transforms a specification in a declarative data-flow language into a C implementation of a monitor with
constant space and time requirements. Lola [2,16] allows for more involved computations, also incorporating
parametrization [25] and real-time capabilities [24] while retaining constant space and time requirements.
Another approach is to enrich temporal logics with quantitative measures such as taking either the edit
distance [33], counting the number of possible infinite models for LTL [27,52], incorporating aggregation
expressions into metric first-order temporal logic [10], or using averaging temporal operators that quantify
the degree of satisfaction of a signal for a specification by integrating the signal w.r.t. a constant reference
signal [3].
Rather than enriching temporal logics with such strong quantitative measures, we consider a robust version
of LTL: rLTL [5,6,51]. Robust semantics yields information about to which degree a trace violates a property.
We adapt the semantics to work with finite traces by allowing for intermediate verdicts. Here, a certain
degree of violation can be classified as “indefinite” and refined when more information becomes available to
the monitor. In a similar fashion, for Signal Temporal Logic [40,39], Fainekos et al. [22] introduced a notion
of spacial robustness based on interpreting atomic propositions over the real numbers. The sign of the real
number provides information about satisfaction/violation while its absolute value provides information about
robustness, i.e., how much can this value be altered without changing satisfaction/violation. This approach is
complementary to ours since the notion of robustness in rLTL is related to the temporal evolution of atomic
propositions which are interpreted classically, i.e, over the Booleans. Donze et al. [18] introduced a notion of
robustness closer to rLTL in the sense that it measures how long we need to wait for the truth value of a
formula to change. While the semantics of rLTL does not allow to quantify the exact delay needed to change
the truth value of a formula, it allows to distinguish between the influence that different temporal evolutions,
e.g., delays, persistence, and recurrence, have on the truth value of an LTL formula. Closer to rLTL is the
work of Radionova et al. [47] (see also [50]) that established an unexpected connection between LTL and
filtering through a quantitative semantics based on convolution with a kernel. By using different kernels one
can express weaker or stronger interpretation of the same formula. However, this requires the user to choose
multiple kernels and to use multiple semantics to reason about how the degradation of assumptions leads to
the degradation of guarantees. In contrast, no such choices are required in rLTL.
2 Robust Linear Temporal Logic
Throughout this work, we assume basic familiarity with classical LTL and refer the reader to a textbook
for more details on the logic (see, e.g., [7]). Moreover, let us fix some finite set P of atomic propositions
throughout the paper and define Σ = 2P . We denote the set of finite and infinite words over Σ by Σ∗ and Σω,
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respectively. The empty word is denoted by ε and v and @ denote the non-strict and the strict prefix relation,
respectively. Moreover, we denote the set of Booleans by B = {0, 1}.
The logics LTL and rLTL share the same syntax save for a dot superimposed on temporal operators. More
precisely, the syntax of rLTL is given by the grammar
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ→ϕ | ϕ | ϕUϕ | ϕRϕ | ϕ | ϕ,
where p ranges over atomic propositions in P and the temporal operators , U, R, and correspond to
“next”, “until”, “release”, “eventually”, and “always”, respectively.8 The size |ϕ| of a formula ϕ is the number of
its distinct subformulas. Furthermore, we denote the set of all LTL and rLTL formulas over P by ΦLTL and
ΦrLTL, respectively.
The development of rLTL was motivated by the observation that the difference between “minor” and
“major” violations of a formula cannot be adequately described in a two-valued semantics. If an LTL formula ϕ,
for example, demands that the property p holds at all positions of a word σ ∈ Σω, then σ violates ϕ even
if p does not hold at only a single position, a very minor violation. The semantics of LTL, however, does
not differentiate between the σ above and a σ′ in which the property p never holds, a major violation of the
property ϕ.
In order to alleviate this shortcoming, Tabuada and Neider introduced Robust Linear-time Temporal
Logic (rLTL) [51], whose semantics allows for distinguishing various “degrees” to which a word violates a
formula. More precisely, the semantics of rLTL are defined over the set B4 = {0000, 0001, 0011, 0111, 1111} of
five truth values, each of which is a monotonically increasing sequence of four bits. We order the truth values
in B4 by 0000 < 0001 < 0011 < 0111 < 1111.
Intuitively, this order reflects increasingly desirable outcomes. If the specification is p, the least desirable
outcome, represented by 0000, is that p never holds on the entire trace. A slightly more desirable outcome
is that p at least holds sometime but not infinitely often, which results in the value 0001. An even more
desirable outcome would be if p holds infinitely often, while also being violated infinitely often, represented by
0011. Climbing up the ladder of desirable outcomes, the next best one requires p to hold infinitely often while
being violated only finitely often, represented by the value 0111. Lastly, the optimal outcome fully satisfies
p, so p hold the entire time, represented by 1111. Thus, the first bit states whether p is satisfied, the
second one stands for p, the third one for p, and the fourth one for p. If all of them are 0, ¬p
holds. The robust release is defined analogously.
The robust eventually-operator considers future positions in the trace and returns the truth value with
the least degree of violation, which is a maximization with respect to the order defined above. This closely
resembles the LTL definition. The robust until is defined analogously.
Based on this, the boolean conjunction and disjunction are defined as min and max, respectively, w.r.t.
the order defined above, which generalizes the classical definition thereof. For the implication, consider a
specification a→ g, where a is an assumption on the environment and g is a system guarantee. If
the truth value of g is greater or equal to the one of a, the assumption is fully satisfied. Thus, the rLTL
semantics takes the violation of the assumption into account and lowers the requirements on the guarantees.
However, if the guarantee exhibits a greater violation than the assumptions, the truth value of the implication
is the same as the one of the guarantee. Lastly, the intuition behind the negation is that every truth value
that is not 1111 constitutes a violation of the specification. Thus, the negation thereof is a full satisfaction
(1111). The negation of the truth value representing a perfect satisfaction (1111) is a full violation (0000).
To introduce the semantics, we need some additional notation: For σ = σ(0)σ(1)σ(2) · · · ∈ Σω and a
natural number n, define σ[n,∞) = σ(n)σ(n+ 1)σ(n+ 2) · · · , (i.e., as the suffix of σ obtained by removing
the first n letters of σ). To be able to refer to individual bits of an rLTL truth value β ∈ B4, we use β[i] with
i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} as to denote the i-th bit of β.
For the sake of a simpler presentation, we denote the semantics of both LTL and rLTL not in terms of
satisfaction relations but by means of valuation functions. For LTL, the valuation function V : Σω×ΦLTL → B
8 Note that we include the operators ∧, →, and R explicitly in the syntax as they cannot be derived from other
operators due to the many-valued nature of rLTL. Following the original work on rLTL [51], we also include the
operators and explicitly (which can be derived from U and R, respectively).
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assigns to each infinite word σ ∈ Σω and each LTL formula ϕ ∈ ΦLTL the value 1 if σ satisfies ϕ and the
value 0 if σ does not satisfy ϕ, and is defined as usual (see, e.g., [7]). The semantics of rLTL, on the other
hand, is more complex and formalized next by an evaluation function Vr : Σω × ΦrLTL → B4 mapping an
infinite word σ ∈ Σω and an rLTL formula ϕ to a truth value in B4.
– Vr(σ, p) =
{
1111 if p ∈ σ(0),
0000 if p /∈ σ(0),
– Vr(σ,¬ϕ) =
{
1111 if Vr(σ, ϕ) 6= 1111,
0000 if Vr(σ, ϕ) = 1111,
– Vr(σ, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = min{Vr(σ, ϕ1), Vr(σ, ϕ2)},
– Vr(σ, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = max{Vr(σ, ϕ1), Vr(σ, ϕ2)},
– Vr(σ, ϕ1→ϕ2) =
{
1111 if Vr(σ, ϕ1) ≤ Vr(σ, ϕ2),
Vr(σ, ϕ2) if Vr(σ, ϕ1) > Vr(σ, ϕ2),
– Vr(σ, ϕ) = Vr(σ[1,∞), ϕ),
– Vr(σ, ϕ) = β with β[i] = maxn≥0 Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ)[i], i ∈ {1, . . . , 4},
– Vr(σ, ϕ) = β with
• β[1] = minn≥0 Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ)[1],
• β[2] = maxm≥0minn≥m Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ)[2],
• β[3] = minm≥0maxn≥m Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ)[3],
• β[4] = maxn≥0 Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ)[4],
– Vr(σ, ϕ1Uϕ2) = β with β[i] = maxn≥0 min{ Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ2)[i], min0≤n′<n Vr(σ[n′,∞), ϕ1)[i] }, i ∈
{1, . . . , 4}
– Vr(σ, ϕ1Rϕ2) = β with
• β[1] = minn≥0max{Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ2)[1],max0≤n′<n Vr(σ[n′,∞), ϕ1)[1]},
• β[2] = maxm≥0minn≥mmax{Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ2)[2],max0≤n′<n Vr(σ[n′,∞), ϕ1)[2]},
• β[3] = minm≥0maxn≥mmax{Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ2)[3],max0≤n′<n Vr(σ[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]}, and
• β[4] = maxn≥0max{Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ2)[4],max0≤n′<n Vr(σ[n′,∞), ϕ1)[4]}.
Due to space restrictions, we have to refer the reader to the original work by Tabuada and Neider [51] for
a thorough introduction and motivation.
However, we here want to illustrate the definition above and briefly argue that it indeed captures the
intuition described at the beginning of this section. To this end, we reconsider the formulas p and a→ g
in Examples 1 and 2, respectively.
Example 1. Consider the formula p and the following five infinite words over the set P = {p} of atomic
propositions:
σ1 = {p}ω (“p holds always”)
σ2 = ∅{p}ω (“p holds almost always”)
σ3 = (∅{p})ω (“p holds infinitely often”)
σ4 = {p}∅ω (“p holds finitely often”)
σ5 = ∅ω (“p holds never”)
Let us begin the example with the word σ1 = {p}ω. It is not hard to verify that Vr(σ1, p)[1] = 1 because
p always holds in σ1, i.e., minn≥0 Vr(σ[n,∞), p)[1] = 1 for n ≥ 0. Using the same argument, we also have
Vr(σ1, p)[2] = Vr(σ1, p)[3] = Vr(σ1, p)[4] = 1. Thus, Vr(σ1, p) = 1111.
Next, let us consider the word σ2 = ∅{p}ω. In this case, we have Vr(σ1, p)[1] = 0 because Vr(σ[0,∞), p)[1] =
0 (p does not hold in the first symbol of σ2). However, Vr(σ1, p)[2] = 1 because p holds almost al-
ways, i.e., maxm≥0minn≥m Vr(σ[n,∞), p)[2] = 1. Moreover, Vr(σ1, p)[3] = Vr(σ1, a)[4] = 1 and, thus,
Vr(σ2, p) = 0111. Similarly, we obtain Vr(σ3, p) = 0011, Vr(σ4, p) = 0001, and Vr(σ5, p) = 0000.
In conclusion, this indeed illustrates that the semantics of the robust always is in accordance with the
intuition provided at the beginning of this section.
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Example 2. Let us now consider the more complex formula a→ g, where we interpret a to be an assumption
on the environment of a cyber-physical system and g one of its guarantees. Moreover, let σ be an infinite
word over P = {a, g} such that Vr(σ, a→ g) = 1111. We now distinguish various cases.
First, let us assume that σ is such that Vr(σ, a) = 1111, i.e., a always holds. By definition of the robust
implication and since Vr(σ, a→ g) = 1111, this can only be the case if Vr(σ, g) = 1111. Thus, the
formula a→ g ensures that if the environment assumption a always holds, so does the system guarantee g.
Next, assume that σ is such that Vr(σ, a) = 0111, i.e., a does not always hold but almost always.
By definition of the robust implication and since Vr(σ, a→ g) = 1111, this can only be the case if
Vr(σ, g) ≥ 0111. In this case, the formula a→ g ensures that if the environment assumption a holds
almost always, then the system guarantee g holds almost always or—even better—always.
It is not hard to verify that we obtain similar results for the cases Vr(σ, a) ∈ {0011, 0001, 0000}. In other
words, the semantics of rLTL ensures that the violation of the system guarantee g is always proportional to
the violation of the environment assumption a (given that Vr(σ, a→ g) evaluates to 1111). Again, this
illustrates that the semantics of the implication is in accordance with the intuition provided at the beginning
of this section.
Alternatively, the rLTL evaluation function can be expressed by evaluating a sequence of four LTL
formulas ϕi, one for each bit i, obtained by a straightforward rewriting of ϕ (Definition 4 and Table 2 in
Appendix A explain how this transformation proceeds in general).
Remark 1. Let ϕ be an rLTL formula that has no always in the scope of a negation and only uses negation,
conjunction, disjunction, next, eventually, and always. Then, for all σ ∈ Σω,
– Vr(σ, ϕ)[1] = V (σ, ϕ1) where ϕ1 is the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every / / by / / ,
respectively,
– Vr(σ, ϕ)[2] = V (σ, ϕ2) where ϕ2 is the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every / by / , and
by ,
– Vr(σ, ϕ)[3] = V (σ, ϕ3) where ϕ3 is the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every / by / , and
by ,
– Vr(σ, ϕ)[4] = V (σ, ϕ4) where ϕ4 is the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every / by / , and
by .
Finally, note that rLTL is an extension of LTL. In fact, the LTL semantics can be recovered from the first
bit of the rLTL semantics [51] (after every implication ϕ→ψ has been replaced with ¬ϕ ∨ ψ).9
3 Monitoring Robust LTL
In their work on LTL monitoring, Bauer et al. [13] define the problem of runtime monitoring as “check[ing]
LTL properties given finite prefixes of infinite [words]”. More formally, given some prefix u ∈ Σ∗ and
some LTL formula ϕ, it asks whether all, some, or no infinite extension uσ ∈ Σω of u by some σ ∈ Σω
satisfies ϕ. To reflect these three possible results, the authors use the set B? = {0, ?, 1} to define a three-
valued logic that is syntactically identical to LTL, but equipped with a semantics in form of an evaluation
function V m : Σ∗ ×ΦLTL → B? over finite prefixes. This semantics is defined such that V m(u, ϕ) is equal to 0
(is equal to 1) if no (if every) extension uσ of u satisfies ϕ. If neither is the case, i.e., if there is an extension
of u that satisfies ϕ and there is an extension of u that does not satisfy ϕ, then V m(u, ϕ) is equal to ?.
We aim to extend the approach of Bauer et al. to rLTL, whose semantics is based on truth values from
the set B4 (containing the sequences of length four in 0∗1∗). As a motivating example, let us consider the
9 It turns out that Tabuada and Neider’s original proof [51, Proposition 5] has a minor mistake. Although the first bit
of the rLTL semantics coincides with the original LTL semantics for all formulas that do not contain implications,
the formula ¬a→ a is an example witnessing this claim is no longer correct in the presence of implications, e.g.,
for {a}∅ω. However, this issue can be fixed by replacing every implication ϕ→ψ with ¬ϕ ∨ ψ. This substitution
results in an equivalent LTL formula for which the first bit of the rLTL semantics indeed coincides with the LTL
semantics.
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formula ϕ = s for some atomic proposition s and study which situations can arise when monitoring this
formula. Note that the truth value of ϕ can be obtained by concatenating the truth values of the LTL formulas
ϕ1 = s, ϕ2 = s, ϕ3 = s, and ϕ4 = s.
First, consider the empty prefix and its two extensions ∅ω and {s}ω. We have Vr(∅ω, ϕ) = 0000 and
Vr({s}ω, ϕ) = 1111. Thus, all four bits can both be equal to 0 and 1. This situation is captured by the
sequence ???? which signifies that for every position i and every bit b ∈ B, there exists an extension of ε that
has bit b in the i-th position of the truth value with respect to ϕ.
Now, consider the prefix {s} for which we have Vr({s}σ, ϕ)[4] = 1 for every σ ∈ Σω as ϕ4 = s is
satisfied on each extension of {s} (s has already occurred). On the other hand, Vr({s}∅ω, ϕ) = 0001 and
Vr({s}{s}ω, ϕ) = 1111, i.e., the first three bits can both be 0 and 1 by picking an appropriate extension.
Hence, the situation is captured by the sequence ???1, signifying that the last bit is determined by the prefix,
but the first three are not. Using dual arguments, the sequence 0??? is used for the prefix ∅, signifying that
the first bit is determined by the prefix as every extension violates ϕ1 = s. However, the last three bits are
not yet determined by the prefix, hence the trailing ?’s.
Finally, consider the prefix {s}∅. Using the same arguments as for the previous two prefixes, we obtain
Vr({s}∅σ, ϕ)[1] = 0 and Vr({s}∅σ, ϕ)[4] = 1 for every σ ∈ Σω. Also, as before, we have Vr({s}∅∅ω, ϕ) = 0001
and Vr({s}∅{s}ω, ϕ) = 0111. Hence, here we obtain the sequence 0??1 signifying that the first and last bit
are determined by the prefix, but the middle two are not.
In general, we use truth values of the form 0∗?∗1∗, which follows from the fact that the truth values of
rLTL are in 0∗1∗. Hence, let B?4 denote the set of sequences of length four in 0∗?∗1∗. Based on B?4, we now
formally define the rLTL monitoring semantics as a bitwise generalization of the LTL definition.
Definition 1. The semantics of the robust monitor V mr : Σ∗ × ΦrLTL → B?4 is defined as V mr (u, ϕ) = β with
β[i] =

0 if Vr(uσ, ϕ)[i] = 0 for all σ ∈ Σω;
1 if Vr(uσ, ϕ)[i] = 1 for all σ ∈ Σω; and
? otherwise,
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, every rLTL formula ϕ, and every u ∈ Σ∗.
Using this semantics, we are able to infer information about the infinite run of a system after having read
only a finite prefix thereof. In fact, this robust semantics provides far more information about the degree of
violation of the specification than classical LTL monitoring as each bit of the monitoring output represents a
degree of violation of the specification: a ? turning into a 0 or 1 indicates a deterioration or improvement
in the system’s state, respectively. Consider, for instance, an autonomous drone with specification ϕ = s
where s denotes a state of stable flight (recall the motivating example on Page 7). Initially, the monitor would
output ???? due to a lack of information. If taking off under windy conditions, the state s is not reached
initially, hence the monitor issues a warning by producing V mr (∅n, ϕ) = 0??? for every n > 0. Thus, the safety
condition is violated temporarily, but not irrecoverably. Hence, mitigation measures can be initiated. Upon
success, the monitoring output turns into V mr (∅n{s}, ϕ) = 0??1 for every n > 0, signaling that flight was
stable for some time.
Before we continue, let us first state that the new semantics is well-defined, i.e., that the sequence β[1]β[2]β[3]β[4]
in Definition 1 is indeed in B?4.
Lemma 1. V mr (u, ϕ) ∈ B?4 for every rLTL formula ϕ and every u ∈ Σ∗.
After having shown that every possible output of V mr is in B?4, the next obvious question is whether
V mr is surjective, i.e., whether every truth value β ∈ B?4 is realized by some prefix u ∈ Σ∗ and some rLTL
formula ϕ in the sense that V mr (u, ϕ) = β. Recall the motivating example above: The formula s realizes
at least the following four truth values: ???? (on ε), ???1 (on {s}), 0??? (on ∅), and 0??1 (on {s}∅). It is
not hard to convince oneself that these are all truth values realized by s as they represent the following
four types of prefixes that can be distinguished: the prefix is empty (truth value ????), the prefix is in {s}+
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Table 1: Realizable truth values. For every truth value β, the next two columns show prefixes u and formulas
ϕ such that V mr (u, ϕ) = β, or that β is unrealizable.
Value Prefix Formula Value Prefix Formula
0000 ε a ∧ ¬a 0?11 ∅{a} a ∨ ¬a
000? ε a ∧ ¬ a 0111 ∅{a} aR a
0001 unrealizable ???? ε a
00?? ε a ∧ ¬a ???1 {a} a
00?1 ∅{a} a ∧ ¬a ??11 ε a ∨ ¬ a
0011 unrealizable ?111 ε a ∨ ¬ ¬ ¬a
0??? ∅ a 1111 ε a ∨ ¬a
0??1 ∅{a} a
(truth value ???1), the prefix is in ∅+ (truth value 0???), or the prefix contains both an {s} and an ∅ (truth
value 0??1).
For most other truth values, it is straightforward to come up with rLTL formulas and prefixes that realize
them. See Table 1 for an overview and recall Remark 1, which is applicable to all these formulas.
For others, such as 0011, it is much harder. Intuitively, to realize 0011, one needs to find an rLTL formula ϕ
and a prefix u ∈ Σ∗ such that the formula obtained by replacing all in ϕ by is not satisfied by any
extension of u, but the formula obtained by replacing all in ϕ by is satisfied by every extension of
u.10 Thus, intuitively, the prefix has to differentiate between a property holding almost always and holding
infinitely often. It turns out that no such u and ϕ exist. A similar argument is true for 0001, leading to the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. All truth values except for 0011 and 0001 are realizable.
As shown in Table 1, all of the realizable truth values except for 0111 are realized by formulas using only
conjunction, disjunction, negation, eventually, and always. Further, 0111 can only be realized by a formula
with the release operator while the truth values 0011 and 0001 are indeed not realizable at all.
Note that the two unrealizable truth values 0011 and 0001 both contain a 0 that is directly followed by a 1.
The proof of unrealizability formalizes the intuition that such an “abrupt” transition from definitive violation
of a property to definitive satisfaction of the property cannot be witnessed by any finite prefix. Finally, the
only other truth value of this form, 0111, is only realizable by using a formula with the release operator.
Going again back to the motivating example s, consider the evolution of the truth values on the
sequence ε, {s}, {s}∅: They are ????, ???1, and 0??1, i.e., 0’s and 1’s are stable when extending a prefix, only
a ? may be replaced by a 0 or a 1. This property holds in general. To formalize this, say that β′ ∈ B?4 is more
specific than β ∈ B?4, written as β  β′, if, for all i, β[i] 6= ? implies β′[i] = β[i].
Lemma 2. Let ϕ be an rLTL formula and u, u′ ∈ Σ∗. If u v u′, then V mr (u, ϕ)  V mr (u′, ϕ).
Lemma 2 immediately implies two properties of the semantics: impartiality and anticipation [17]. Impartial-
ity states that a definitive verdict will never be revoked: If V mr (u, ϕ)[i] 6= ?, then for all finite extensions v ∈ Σ∗,
the verdict will not change, so V mr (uv, ϕ)[i] = V mr (u, ϕ)[i]. Anticipation requires that a definitive verdict is
decided as soon as possible, i.e., if V mr (u, ϕ)[i] = ?, then u can still be extended to satisfy and to violate ϕ
with the i-th bit. Formally, there have to exist infinite extensions σ0 and σ1 such that Vr(uσ0, ϕ)[i] = 0 and
Vr(uσ1, ϕ)[i] = 1. Anticipation holds by definition of V mr (u, ϕ).
Due to Lemma 2, for a fixed formula, the prefixes of every infinite word can assume at most five different
truth values, which are all of increasing specificity. It turns out that this upper bound is tight. To formalize
this claim, we denote the strict version of  by ≺, i.e., β ≺ β′ if and only if β  β′ and β 6= β′.
10 Note that this intuition breaks down in the presence of implications and negation, due to their non-standard
definitions.
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Lemma 3. There is an rLTL formula ϕ and prefixes u0 @ u1 @ u2 @ u3 @ u4 such that V mr (u0, ϕ) ≺
V mr (u1, ϕ) ≺ V mr (u2, ϕ) ≺ V mr (u3, ϕ) ≺ V mr (u4, ϕ).
After determining how many different truth values can be assumed by prefixes of a single infinite word,
an obvious question is how many truth values can be realized by a fixed formula on different prefixes. It
is not hard to combine the formulas in Table 1 to a formula that realizes all truth values not ruled out by
Theorem 1.11
Lemma 4. There is an rLTL formula ϕ such that for every β ∈ B?4 \ {0011, 0001} there is a prefix uβ with
V mr (uβ , ϕ) = β.
Finally, let us consider the notion of monitorability [46], an important concept in the theory of runtime
monitoring. As a motivation, consider the LTL formula ψ = s and an arbitrary prefix u ∈ Σ∗. Then, the
extension u{s}ω satisfies ψ while the extension u∅ω does not satisfy ψ, i.e., satisfaction of ψ is independent
of any prefix u. Hence, we have V m(u, ψ) = ? for every prefix u, i.e., monitoring the formula ψ does not
generate any information.
In general, for a fixed LTL formula ϕ, a prefix u ∈ Σ∗ is called ugly if we have V m(uv, ϕ) = ? for every
finite v ∈ Σ∗, i.e., every finite extension of u yields an indefinite verdict.12 Now, ϕ is LTL-monitorable if
there is no ugly prefix with respect to ϕ. A wide range of LTL formulas (e.g., ψ = s as above) are
unmonitorable in that sense. In particular, 44% of the LTL formulas considered in the experiments of Bauer
et al. are not LTL-monitorable.
We next generalize the notion of monitorability to rLTL. In particular, we answer whether there are
unmonitorable rLTL formulas. Then, in Section 5, we exhibit that all LTL formulas considered by Bauer
et al.’s experimental evaluation, even the unmonitorable ones, are monitorable under rLTL semantics. To
conclude the motivating example, note that the rLTL analogue s of the LTL formula ψ induces two truth
values from B?4 indicating whether s has been true at least once (truth value ???1) or not (truth value ????).
Even more so, every prefix inducing the truth value ???? can be extended to one inducing the truth value ???1.
Definition 2. Let ϕ be an rLTL formula. A prefix u ∈ Σ∗ is called ugly if we have V m(uv, ϕ) = ???? for
every finite v ∈ Σ∗. Further, ϕ is rLTL-monitorable if it has no ugly prefix.
As argued above, the formula s has no ugly prefix, i.e., it is rLTL-monitorable. Thus, we have found
an unmonitorable LTL formula whose rLTL analogue (the formula obtained by adding dots to all temporal
operators) is monitorable. The converse statement is also true. There is a monitorable LTL formula whose
rLTL analogue is unmonitorable. To this end, consider the LTL formula
( s ∧ ¬s)→ ( s ∧ ¬ s),
which is a tautology and therefore monitorable. On the other hand, we claim that ∅{s} is an ugly prefix for
the rLTL analogue ϕ obtained by adding dots to the temporal operators. To this end note that we have both
Vr(∅{s}v∅ω, ϕ) = 1111 and Vr(∅{s}v{s}ω, ϕ) = 0000 for every v ∈ Σ∗. Hence, V mr (∅{s}v, ϕ) = ???? for every
such v, i.e., ∅{s} is indeed ugly and ϕ therefore not rLTL-monitorable.
Thus, there are formulas that are unmonitorable under LTL semantics, but monitorable under rLTL
semantics and there are formulas that are unmonitorable under rLTL semantics, but monitorable under LTL
semantics. Using these formulas one can also construct a formula that is unmonitorable under both semantics.
To this end, fix LTL formulas ϕ` and ϕr over disjoint sets of propositions and a fresh proposition p not
used in either formula such that
11 However, there are also formulas assuming many truth values, e.g., the following formula from LTLStore [34], which
assumes ten different truth values:
(((a ∧ d) ∨ (¬a ∧ ¬d)) ∧ (¬b ∨ (¬a ∧ d))) ∨ (((¬a ∧ d) ∨ (a ∧ ¬d)) ∧ (b ∧ (a ∨ ¬d))) ∨ (a ∧ b)
12 Note that the good/bad prefixes introduced by Kupfermann and Vardi [36] always yield a positive/negative verdict,
respectively. Ugly prefixes [13] always yield an indefinite verdict.
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– ϕ` has an ugly prefix u` under LTL semantics, and
– ϕr (with dotted operators) has an ugly prefix ur under rLTL semantics.
We can assume both prefixes to be non-empty, as ugliness is closed under finite extensions. Let ϕ =
(p ∧ ϕ`) ∨ (¬p ∧ ϕr). Then, the prefix obtained from u` by adding the proposition p to the first letter is ugly
for ϕ under LTL semantics and ur is ugly for ϕ (with dotted operators) under rLTL semantics.
As a final example, recall that we have shown that s is rLTL-monitorable and consider its nega-
tion ¬ s. It is not hard to see that V mr (u, ϕ) = ???? holds for every prefix u. Hence, ε is an ugly prefix
for the formula, i.e., we have found another unmonitorable rLTL formula. In particular, the example shows
that, unlike for LTL, rLTL-monitorability is not preserved under negation.
After having studied properties of rLTL monitorability, we next show our main result: The robust
monitoring semantics V mr can be implemented by finite-state machines.
4 Construction of rLTL Monitors
An rLTL monitor is an implementation of the robust monitoring semantics V mr in form of a finite-state
machine with output. More precisely, an rLTL monitor for an rLTL formula ϕ is a finite-state machineMϕ
that on reading an input u ∈ Σ∗ outputs V mr (u, ϕ). In this section, we show how to construct rLTL monitors
and that this construction is asymptotically not more expensive than the construction of LTL monitors. Let
us fix an rLTL formula ϕ for the remainder of this section.
Our rLTL monitor construction is inspired by Bauer et al. [13] and generates a sequence of finite-state
machines (i.e., Büchi automata over infinite words, (non)deterministic automata over finite words, and Moore
machines). Underlying these machines are transition structures T = (Q, qI , ∆) consisting of a nonempty,
finite set Q of states, an initial state qI ∈ Q, and a transition relation ∆ ⊆ Q×Σ ×Q. An (infinite) run of T
on a word σ = a0a1a2 · · · ∈ Σω is a sequence ρ = q0q1 · · · of states such that q0 = qI and (qj , aj , qj+1) ∈ ∆
for j ∈ N. Finite runs on finite words are defined analogously. The transition structure T is deterministic
if (a) (q, a, q′) ∈ ∆ and (q, a, q′′) ∈ ∆ imply q′ = q′′ and (b) for each q ∈ Q and a ∈ Σ there exists a
(q, a, q′) ∈ ∆. We then replace the transition relation ∆ by a function δ : Q×Σ → Q. Finally, we define the
size of a transition structure T as |T | = |Q| in order to measure its complexity.
Our construction then proceeds in three steps:
1. We bring ϕ into an operational form by constructing Büchi automata Aϕβ for each truth value β ∈ B4
that can decide the valuation Vr(σ, ϕ) of infinite words σ ∈ Σω.
2. Based on these Büchi automata, we then construct nondeterministic automata Bϕβ that can decide whether
a finite word u ∈ Σ∗ can still be extended to an infinite word uσ ∈ Σω with Vr(uσ, ϕ) = β.
3. We determinize the nondeterministic automata obtained in Step 2 and combine them into a single Moore
machine that computes V mr (u, ϕ).
Let us now describe each of these steps in detail.
Step 1: We first translate the rLTL formula ϕ into several Büchi automata using a construction by Tabuada
and Neider [51], summarized in Theorem 2 below. A Büchi automaton is a four-tuple A = (Q, qI , ∆, F ) where
T = (Q, qI , ∆) is a transition structure and F ⊆ Q is a set of accepting states. A run pi of A on σ ∈ Σω is a
run of T on σ, and we say that pi is accepting if it contains infinitely many states from F . The automaton A
accepts a word σ if there exists an accepting run of A on σ. The language L(A) is the set of all words accepted
by A, and the size of A is defined as |A| = |T |.
Theorem 2 (Tabuada and Neider [51]). Given a truth value β ∈ B4, one can construct a Büchi
automaton Aϕβ with 2O(|ϕ|) states such that L(Aϕβ ) = {σ ∈ Σω | Vr(σ, ϕ) = β}. This construction can be
performed in 2O(|ϕ|) time.
The Büchi automata Aϕβ for β ∈ B4 serve as building blocks for the next steps.
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Step 2: For each Büchi automaton Aϕβ obtained in the previous step, we now construct a nondeterministic
automaton Bϕβ over finite words. This automaton determines whether a finite word u ∈ Σ∗ can be continued
to an infinite word uσ ∈ L(Aϕβ ) (i.e., Vr(uσ, ϕ) = β) and is used later to construct the rLTL monitor.
Formally, a nondeterministic finite automaton (NFA) is a four-tuple A = (Q, qI , ∆, F ) that is syntactically
identical to a Büchi automaton. The size of A is defined analogously to Büchi automata. In contrast to Büchi
automata, however, NFAs only admit finite runs on finite words, i.e., a run of A on u = a0 · · · an−1 ∈ Σ∗ is a
sequence q0 · · · qn such that q0 = qI and (qj , aj , qj+1) ∈ ∆ for every j < n. A run q0 · · · qn is called accepting
if qn ∈ F . Accepted words as well as the language of A are again defined analogously to the Büchi case.
If (Q, qI , ∆) is deterministic, A is a deterministic finite automaton (DFA). It is well-known that for each
NFA A one can construct a DFA A′ with L(A) = L(A′) and |A′| ∈ O(2|A|).
Given the Büchi automaton Aϕβ = (Qβ , qI,β , ∆β , Fβ), we first compute the set F ?β = {q ∈ Qβ | L(Aϕβ (q)) 6=
∅}, where Aϕβ (q) denotes the Büchi automaton Aϕβ but with initial state q instead of qI . Intuitively, the set
F ?β contains all states q ∈ Qβ from which there exists an accepting run in Aϕβ and, hence, indicates whether a
finite word u ∈ Σ∗ reaching a state of F ?β can be extended to an infinite word uσ′ ∈ L(Aϕβ ). The set F ?β can
be computed, for instance, using a nested depth-first search [49] for each state q ∈ Qβ . Since each such search
requires time quadratic in |Aϕβ |, the set F ?β can be computed in time O(|Aϕβ |3).
Using F ?β , we define the NFA Bϕβ = (Qβ , qI,β , ∆β , F ?β ). It shares the transition structure of Aϕβ and uses
F ?β as the set of final states. The next lemma states that Bϕβ indeed recognizes prefixes of words in L(Aϕβ ).
Lemma 5. Let β ∈ B4 and u ∈ Σ∗. Then, u ∈ L(Bϕβ ) if and only if there exists an infinite word σ ∈ Σω
with Vr(uσ, ϕ) = β.
Before we continue to the last step in our construction, let us briefly comment on the complexity of
computing the NFAs Bϕβ . Since Bϕβ and Aϕβ share the same underlying transition structure, we immediately
obtain |Bϕβ | ∈ 2O(|ϕ|). Moreover, the construction of Bϕβ is dominated by the computation of the set F ?β and,
hence, can be done in time 2O(|ϕ|).
Step 3: In the final step, we construct a Moore machine implementing an rLTL monitor for ϕ. Formally, a
Moore machine is a five-tupleM = (Q, qI , δ, Γ, λ) consisting of a deterministic transition structure (Q, qI , δ),
an output alphabet Γ , and an output function λ : Q→ Γ . The size ofM as well of runs ofM are defined as
for DFAs. In contrast to a DFA, however, a Moore machineM computes a function λM : Σ∗ → Γ that is
defined by λM(u) = λ(qn) where qn is the last state reached on the unique finite run q0 · · · qn ofM on its
input u ∈ Σ∗.
The first step in the construction of the Moore machine is to determinize the NFAs Bϕβ , obtaining equivalent
DFAs Cϕβ = (Q′β , q′I,β , δ′β , F ′β) of at most exponential size in |Bϕβ |. Subsequently, we combine these DFAs into
a single Moore machine Mϕ implementing the desired rLTL monitor. Intuitively, this Moore machine is
the product of the DFAs Cϕβ for each β ∈ B4 and tracks the run of each individual DFA on the given input.
Formally,Mϕ is defined as follows.
Definition 3. Let B4 = {β1, β2, β3, β4, β5}. We defineMϕ = (Q, qI , Γ, δ, λ) by
– Q = Q′β1 ×Q′β2 ×Q′β3 ×Q′β4 ×Q′β5 ;
– qI = (q′I,β1 , q
′
I,β2
, q′I,β3 , q
′
I,β4
, q′I,β5);
– δ
(
(q1, q2, q3, q4, q5), a
)
= (q′1, q
′
2, q
′
3, q
′
4, q
′
5) where q′j = δ′βj (qj , a) for each j ∈ {1, . . . , 5};
– Γ = B?4; and
– λ
(
(q1, q2, q3, q4, q5)
)
= ξ
({
βj ∈ B4 | qj ∈ F ′βj , j ∈ {1, . . . , 5}
})
,
where the surjective function ξ : 2B4 → B?4 translates sets B ⊆ B4 of truth values to the robust monitoring
semantics as follows: ξ(B) = β? ∈ B?4 with
β?[j] =

0 if β[j] = 0 for each β ∈ B;
1 if β[j] = 1 for each β ∈ B; and
? otherwise.
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The main result of this paper now shows that the Moore machine Mϕ implements V mr , i.e., we have
λMϕ(u) = V
m
r (u, ϕ) for every prefix u.
Theorem 3. For every rLTL formula ϕ, one can construct an rLTL monitor of size 22
O(|ϕ|)
.
In a final post-processing step, we minimizeMϕ (e.g., using one of the standard algorithms for deterministic
automata). As a result, we obtain the unique minimal monitor for the given rLTL formula.
It is left to determine the complexity of our rLTL monitor construction. Since each DFA Cϕβ is in the worst
case exponential in the size of the NFA Bϕβ , we immediately obtain that Cϕβ is at most of size 22
O(|ϕ|)
. Thus, the
Moore machineMϕ is at most of size 22O(|ϕ|) as well and can be effectively computed in doubly-exponential
time in |ϕ|. Note that this matches the complexity bound of Bauer et al.’s approach for LTL runtime
monitoring [13]. Moreover, this bound is tight since rLTL subsumes LTL and a doubly-exponential bound is
tight for LTL [36,13]. Hence, robust runtime monitoring asymptotically incurs no extra cost compared to
classical LTL runtime monitoring. However, it provides more useful information as we demonstrate next in
our experimental evaluation.
5 Experimental Evaluation
Besides incorporating a notion of robustness into classical LTL monitoring, our rLTL monitoring approach
also promises to provide richer information than its LTL counterpart. In this section, we evaluate empirically
whether this promise is actually fulfilled. More precisely, we answer the following two questions on a
comprehensive suite of benchmarks:
1. How does rLTL monitoring compare to classical LTL monitoring in terms of monitorability?
2. For formulas that are both LTL-monitorable and rLTL-monitorable, how do both approaches compare in
terms of the size of the resulting monitors and the time required to construct them?
To answer these research questions, we have implemented a prototype, which we named rLTL-mon. Our
prototype is written in Java and builds on top of two libraries: Owl [35], a library for LTL and automata over
infinite words, as well as AutomataLib (part of LearnLib [32]), a library for automata over finite words and
Moore machines. For technical reasons (partly due to limitations of the Owl library and partly to simplify the
implementation), rLTL-mon uses a monitor construction that is slightly different from the one described in
Section 4: Instead of translating an rLTL formula into nondeterministic Büchi automata, rLTL-mon constructs
deterministic parity automata. These parity automata are then directly converted into DFAs, thus skirting
the need for a detour over NFAs and a subsequent determinization step. Note, however, that this alternative
construction produces the same rLTL monitors than the one described in Section 4. Moreover, it has the
same asymptotic complexity. The (anonymized) sources of our prototype are available online under the MIT
license.13
Benchmarks and Experimental Setup Starting point of our evaluation was the original benchmark
suite of Bauer et al. [13], which is based on a survey by Dwyer on frequently used software specification
patterns [20]. This benchmark suite consists of 97 LTL formulas and covers a wide range of patterns, including
safety, scoping, precedence, and response patterns. For our rLTL monitor construction, we interpreted each
LTL formula in the benchmark suite as an rLTL formula (by treating every operator as a robust operator).
We compared rLTL-mon to Bauer et al.’s implementation of their LTL monitoring approach, which the
authors named LTL3 tools. This tool uses LTL2BA [28] to translate LTL formulas into Büchi automata and
AT&T’s fsmlib as a means to manipulate finite-state machines. Since LTL2BA’s and Owl’s input format for
LTL formulas do not match exactly, we have translated all benchmarks into a suitable format using a python
script.
We conducted all experiments on an Intel Core i5-6600 @ 3.3GHz in a virtual machine with 4GB of RAM
running Ubuntu 18.04 LTS. As no monitor construction took longer than 600 s, we did not impose any time
limit.
13 https://gitlab.mpi-sws.org/rltl/rltl-runtime-monitoring-code
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Fig. 1: Comparison of rLTL-mon and LTL3 tools on Bauer et al.’s benchmarks [13]
Results Our evaluation shows that LTL3 tools and rLTL-mon are both able to generate monitors for all
97 formulas in Bauer et al.’s benchmark suite.14 Aggregated statistics of this evaluation are visualized in
Figure 1.15
The histogram in Figure 1a shows the aggregate number of LTL and rLTL monitors with respect to their
number of states. As Bauer et al. already noted in their original work, the resulting LTL monitors are quite
small (none had more than six states), which they attribute to Dwyer et al.’s specific selection of formulas [20].
A similar observation is also true for the rLTL monitors: None had more than eight states.
To determine which formulas are monitorable and which are not, we used a different, though equivalent
definition, which is easy to check on the monitor itself: an LTL formula (rLTL formula) is monitorable if
and only if the unique minimized LTL monitor (rLTL monitor) does not contain a sink-state with universal
self-loop that outputs “?” (that outputs “????”). Bauer et al. report that 44.3% of all LTL monitors (43
out of 97) have this property (in fact, exactly the 43 LTL monitors with a single state), which means that
44.3% of all formulas in their benchmark suite are not LTL-monitorable. By contrast, all these formulas are
rLTL-monitorable. Moreover, in 78.4% of the cases (76 out of 97), the rLTL monitor has more distinct outputs
than the LTL monitor, indicating that the rLTL monitor provides more fine-grained information of the
property being monitored; in the remaining 21.6%, both monitors have the same number of distinct outputs.
These results answer our first research question strongly in favor of rLTL monitoring: rLTL monitoring did in
fact provide more information than its classical LTL counterpart. In particular, only 55.7% of the benchmarks
are LTL-monitorable, whereas 100% are rLTL-monitorable.
Let us now turn to our second research question and compare both monitoring approaches on the 54
formulas that are both LTL-monitorable and rLTL-monitorable. For these formulas, Figure 1b further provides
statistical analysis of the generated monitors in terms of their size (left diagram) as well as the time required
to generate them (right diagram). Each box in the diagrams shows the lower and upper quartile (left and
right border of the box, respectively), the median (line within the box), and minimum and maximum (left
and right whisker, respectively).
Let us first consider the size of the monitors (left diagram of Figure 1b). The majority of LTL monitors
(52) has between two and four states, while the majority of rLTL monitors (45) has between two and five
14 Note that the tools disagreed on one monitor where LTL3 tools constructed a monitor with 1 state whereas
rLTL-mon constructed an LTL monitor with 8 states. The respective formula was removed from the reported results.
15 Detailed results can be found in Table 3 and Table 4 in the appendix.
13
states. For 21 benchmarks, the LTL and rLTL monitors are of equal size, while the rLTL monitor is larger
for the remaining 33 benchmarks (in no case is the LTL monitor larger than the rLTL monitor). On average,
rLTL monitors are about 1.5 times larger than the corresponding LTL monitors.
Let us now discuss the time taken to construct the monitors. As the diagram on the right-hand-side of
Figure 1b shows, LTL3 tools was considerably faster than rLTL-mon on a majority of benchmarks (around
0.1 s and 2.6 s per benchmark, respectively). For all 54 benchmarks, the rLTL monitor construction took
longer than the construction of the corresponding LTL monitor (although there are two non-LTL-monitorable
formulas for which the construction of the rLTL monitor was faster). However, we attribute this large runtime
gap partly to the overhead caused by repeatedly starting the Java virtual machine, which is not required in
the case of LTL3 tools. Note that this is not a concern in practice as a monitor is only constructed once
before it is deployed.
Finally, our analysis answers our second question: rLTL monitors are only slightly larger than the
corresponding LTL monitors and although they require considerably more time to construct, the overall
construction time was negligible for almost all benchmarks.
6 Conclusion
We adapted the three-valued LTL monitoring semantics of Bauer et al. to rLTL, proved that the construction
of monitors is asymptotically no more expensive than the one for LTL, and validated our approach on
the benchmark of Bauer et al.: All formulas are rLTL-monitorable and the rLTL monitor is strictly more
informative than its LTL counterpart for 77% of their formulas.
Recall Theorem 1, which states that the truth values 0011 and 0001 are not realizable. This points to
a drawback regarding the two middle bits: When considering the formula a, the second bit represents
a and the third bit a. A prefix cannot possibly provide enough information to distinguish these two
formulas. On the other hand, the truth value ??11 is realizable, which shows that the middle bits can be
relevant. In further work, we will investigate the role of the middle bits in rLTL monitoring.
Moreover, the informedness of a monitor can be increased further when attributing a special role to the
last position(s) of a prefix. Even though a prefix of the form ∅+{a}+ does not fully satisfy a, neither does
it fully violate it. If the system just now reached a state in which {a} always holds, an infinite continuation
of the execution would satisfy the specification. So rather than reporting an undetermined result, the monitor
could indicate that an infinite repetition of the last position of the prefix would satisfy the specification.
Similarly, for a prefix {a}+∅, the specification a is undetermined. While an infinite repetition of the
last position ({a}+∅ω) does not satisfy the specification, an infinite repetition of the last two positions
({a}+(∅{a})ω) would. We plan to investigate an extension of rLTL which takes this observation into account.
Bauer et al. [11] proposed an orthogonal approach with the logic RV-LTL. Here, the specification can
contain the strong (weak) next-operator whose operand is consider violated (satisfied) at the last position of
the trace. A formula that is undetermined under the strong semantics and satisfied (violated) under the weak
semantics is considered potentially true (potentially false). Incorporating one of these approaches into rLTL
monitoring could refine its output and thus increase its level of informedness.
Moreover, desired properties for cyber-physical systems often include real-time components such as “touch
the ground at most 15 seconds after receiving a landing command”. Monitors for logics taking real-time
into account [14], such as STL [39,40], induce high computational overhead at runtime when compared to
LTL and rLTL monitors. Thus, a real-time extension for rLTL retaining its low runtime cost would greatly
increase its viability as specification language.
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Table 2: The function ltl : {1, . . . , 4} × ΦrLTL → ΦLTL.
Operator Symbol Semantics (where p ∈ P and ϕ,ψ ∈ ΦrLTL)
Atomic proposition p ∈ P 1 ≤ i ≤ 4: ltl(i, p) = p
Negation ¬ 1 ≤ i ≤ 4: ltl(i,¬ϕ) := ¬ltl(1, ϕ)
Disjunction ∨ 1 ≤ i ≤ 4: ltl(i, ϕ ∨ ψ) := ltl(i, ϕ) ∨ ltl(i, ψ)
Conjunction ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ 4: ltl(i, ϕ ∧ ψ) := ltl(i, ϕ) ∧ ltl(i, ψ)
Implication → 1 ≤ i ≤ 3: ltl(i, ϕ→ ψ) := (ltl(i, ϕ)→ ltl(i, ψ)) ∧ ltl(i+ 1, ϕ→ ψ);
ltl(4, ϕ→ ψ) := ltl(4, ϕ)→ ltl(4, ψ)
Robust next 1 ≤ i ≤ 4: ltl(i, ϕ) := ltl(i, ϕ)
Robust eventually 1 ≤ i ≤ 4: ltl(i, ϕ) := ltl(i, ϕ)
Robust always ltl(1, ϕ) := ltl(1, ϕ); ltl(2, ϕ) := ltl(2, ϕ);
ltl(3, ϕ) := ltl(3, ϕ); ltl(4, ϕ) := ltl(4, ϕ)
Robust until U 1 ≤ i ≤ 4: ltl(i, ϕUψ) := ltl(i, ϕ)U ltl(i, ψ)
Robust release R
ltl(1, ϕRψ) := ltl(1, ϕ)R ltl(1, ψ);
ltl(2, ϕRψ) := ltl(2, ψ) ∨ ltl(2, ϕ);
ltl(3, ϕRψ) := ltl(3, ψ) ∨ ltl(3, ϕ);
ltl(4, ϕRψ) := ltl(4, ψ) ∨ ltl(4, ϕ)
A Appendix
Here, we present the proofs omitted in Section 3 on basic properties of the robust monitoring semantics.
A.1 An Alternative Definition of Robust Semantics for LTL
We begin by introducing an alternative definition of the semantics of rLTL, which is more convenient to
prove some of the results from Section 3. This alternative definition has been introduced in later works on
rLTL [6,5].
Definition 4. Let the function ltl : {1, . . . , 4}×ΦrLTL → ΦLTL be inductively defined as in Table 2. The rLTL
semantics is then given as the valuation function Vr : Σω ×ΦrLTL → B4, where for every σ ∈ Σω, every rLTL
formula ϕ, and every i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, the i-th bit of Vr(σ, ϕ) is defined as Vr(σ, ϕ)[i] = V
(
σ, ltl(i, ϕ)
)
(i.e., via
the semantics of the LTL formulas ltl(i, ϕ)).
To reduce the number of cases we have to consider in our inductive proofs, we note that the robust
eventually and the robust always operator are syntactic sugar. Formally, we say that two rLTL formulas ϕ1, ϕ2
are equivalent, if Vr(σ, ϕ1) = Vr(σ, ϕ2) for every σ ∈ Σω. Now, let > = p ∨ ¬p and ⊥ = p ∧ ¬p for some
atomic proposition p. Then, the robust eventually and the robust always are, as usual, expressible in terms of
the robust until and the robust release, respectively.
Remark 2 (Tabuada and Neider [51]).
1. ϕ and >Uϕ are equivalent.
2. ϕ and ⊥Rϕ are equivalent.
A useful feature of the alternative semantics is the following property: To determine the truth value of an
rLTL formula ϕ on σ, it suffices to determine the truth values of the LTL formulas ltl(i, ϕ) on σ. For certain
formulas, ltl(i, ϕ) is obtained from ϕ by a very simple rewriting (see Table 2 and compare Remark 1).
Remark 3. Let ϕ be an rLTL formula that
– only uses negation, conjunction, disjunction, next, eventually, and always, and
– has no always in the scope of a negation.
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Then,
– ltl(1, ϕ) is equivalent to the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every by , every by , and
every by ,
– ltl(2, ϕ) is equivalent to the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every by , every by , and
every by ,
– ltl(3, ϕ) is equivalent to the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every by , every by , and
every by , and
– ltl(4, ϕ) is equivalent to the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every by , every by , and
every by .
A.2 The Main Lemma
We continue by proving a technical lemma about restrictions on the truth values that formulas can assume
on simple words. These are later used to prove that certain truth values are not realizable in rLTL.
Lemma 6. Let ϕ be an rLTL formula.
1. Vr(u∅ω, ϕ)[2] = Vr(u∅ω, ϕ)[3] for all u ∈ Σ∗.
2. Vr(uω, ϕ)[3] = Vr(uω, ϕ)[4] for all non-empty u ∈ Σ∗.
3. If ϕ does not contain the release operator, then Vr(uω, ϕ)[1] = Vr(uω, ϕ)[2] for all non-empty u ∈ Σ∗.
Proof. The proofs of all three items proceed by induction over the construction of ϕ. The induction start
and the induction steps for Boolean connectives can be abstracted into the following closure property, which
follows easily from the original definition of Vr in Section 2:
Let T ⊆ B4 contain 0000 and 1111. If Vr(σ, ϕ1) and Vr(σ, ϕ2) are in T , then so are Vr(σ, p) for atomic
propositions p, Vr(σ,¬ϕ1), Vr(σ, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2), Vr(σ, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2), and Vr(σ, ϕ1→ϕ2).
1.) The induction start and the induction step for the Boolean operators follow from the closure property,
where we pick T to be the set of truth values from B4 whose second and third bit coincide. Furthermore,
due to Remark 2, we only have to consider the inductive steps for the next, until, and release operator. All
three cases rely on the following simple fact: A suffix u∅ω[n,∞) for some n is again of the form u′∅ω, i.e., the
induction hypothesis is applicable to suffixes. Also, if n ≥ |u|, then u∅ω[n,∞) = ∅ω. In particular, u∅ω has
only finitely many distinct suffixes.
So, first consider a formula of the form ϕ = ϕ1. Then, we have, for an arbitrary u ∈ Σ∗,
Vr(u∅ω, ϕ)[2] =Vr(u∅ω[1,∞), ϕ1)[2]
=Vr(u∅ω[1,∞), ϕ1)[3] = Vr(u∅ω, ϕ)[3],
where the second equality is due to the induction hypothesis being applied to the suffix u∅ω[1,∞).
Next, consider a formula of the form ϕ = ϕ1Uϕ2. Then, we have, for an arbitrary u ∈ Σ∗,
Vr(u∅ω, ϕ)[2]
=max
n≥0
min{Vr(u∅ω[n,∞), ϕ2)[2], min
0≤n′<n
Vr(u∅ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[2]}
=max
n≥0
min{Vr(u∅ω[n,∞), ϕ2)[3], min
0≤n′<n
Vr(u∅ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]}
=Vr(u∅ω, ϕ)[3],
where the second equality follows from an application of the induction hypothesis to the suffixes u∅ω[n,∞)
and u∅ω[n′,∞).
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It remains to consider a formula of the form ϕ = ϕ1Rϕ2. Then, we have, for an arbitrary u ∈ Σ∗, that
Vr(u∅ω, ϕ)[2] is by definition equal to
max
m≥0
min
n≥m
max{Vr(u∅ω[n,∞), ϕ2)[2], max
0≤n′<n
Vr(u∅ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[2]}
=max
m≥0
min
n≥m
max{Vr(u∅ω[n,∞), ϕ2)[3], max
0≤n′<n
Vr(u∅ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]}
= max
m≥|u|
min
n≥m
max{Vr(u∅ω[n,∞), ϕ2)[3], max
0≤n′<n
Vr(u∅ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]}
= max
m≥|u|
min
n≥m
max{Vr(∅ω, ϕ2)[3], max
0≤n′≤|u|
Vr(u∅ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]}
=max{Vr(∅ω, ϕ2)[3], max
0≤n′≤|u|
Vr(u∅ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]},
The first equality follows from twice applying the induction hypothesis. For the second one, observe that
min
n≥m
max{Vr(u∅ω[n,∞), ϕ2)[3], max
0≤n′<n
Vr(u∅ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]}
is increasing in m. For the third one, note that for all n ≥ |u|, u∅ω[n,∞) = ∅ω, which means that we have
eliminated every occurrence of m and n. This explains the last equality. Similarly, Vr(u∅ω, ϕ)[3] is by definition
equal to
min
m≥0
max
n≥m
max{Vr(u∅ω[n,∞), ϕ2)[3], max
0≤n′<n
Vr(u∅ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]}
=max{Vr(∅ω, ϕ2)[3], max
0≤n′≤|u|
Vr(u∅ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]},
where the equality again follows from all suffixes u∅ω[n,∞) with n ≥ |u| being equal to ∅ω. Thus, we have
derived the desired equality between Vr(u∅ω, ϕ)[2] and Vr(u∅ω, ϕ)[3].
2.) The induction start and the induction steps for Boolean operators follow from the closure property,
where we here pick T to be the set of truth values from B4 whose third and fourth bit coincide. For
u = u(0) · · ·u(|u| − 1) and n < |u|, we define ρ(u, n) = u(n) · · ·u(|u| − 1)u(0) · · ·u(n − 1), i.e., ρ(u, n) is
obtained by “rotating” u n times. The induction steps for the temporal operators are based on the following
simple fact: The suffix uω[n,∞) is equal to (ρ(u, n mod |u|))ω, i.e., the induction hypothesis is applicable to
the suffixes. In particular, uω has only finitely many distinct suffixes, which all appear infinitely often in a
cyclic order.
Now, the induction steps for the next and until operator are analogous to their counterparts in Item 1, as
the only property we require there is that the induction hypothesis is applicable to suffixes. Hence, due to
Remark 2, it only remains to consider the inductive step for the release operator.
So consider a formula of the form ϕ = ϕ1Rϕ2. Then, we have, for an arbitrary u ∈ Σ∗, that Vr(uω, ϕ)[3]
is by definition equal to
min
m≥0
max
n≥m
max{Vr(uω[n,∞), ϕ2)[3], max
0≤n′<n
Vr(u
ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]}
=min
m≥0
max
n≥m
max{Vr(uω[n,∞), ϕ2)[4], max
0≤n′<n
Vr(u
ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[4]}
= max
0≤n<|u|
max{Vr((ρ(u, n))ω, ϕ2)[4], max
0≤n′<n
Vr((ρ(u, n
′))ω, ϕ1)[4]},
where the first equality follows from twice applying the induction hypothesis and the second one is due to all
suffixes uω[n,∞) being equal to ρ(u, n mod |u|)ω, and that there are only finitely many, which all appear
infinitely often in a cyclic order among the (ρ(u, n))ω for 0 ≤ n < |u|.
Similarly, Vr(uω, ϕ)[4] is by definition equal to
max
n≥0
max{Vr(uω[n,∞), ϕ2)[4], max
0≤n′<n
Vr(u
ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[4]}
= max
0≤n<|u|
max{Vr((ρ(u, n))ω, ϕ2)[4], max
0≤n′<n
Vr((ρ(u, n
′))ω, ϕ1)[4]},
20
where the equality again follows from all suffixes uω[n,∞) being equal to ρ(u, n mod |u|)ω, and that there
are only finitely many, which appear in a cyclic order: In particular, after the first |u| suffixes, we have seen
all of them. Thus, we have derived the desired equality between Vr(uω, ϕ)[3] and Vr(uω, ϕ)[4].
3.) The induction start and the induction steps for Boolean operators are covered by the closure property,
where we here pick T to be the set of truth values from B4 whose first and second bit coincide. The cases of
the next and until operator are again analogous to the first and second item. Hence, we only have to consider
the inductive step for the always operator, as we here only consider formulas without release.
So, consider a formula of the form ϕ = ϕ1. Here, we again rely on the fact that the suffix uω[n,∞) is
equal to (ρ(u, n mod |u|))ω. By definition, Vr(uω, ϕ)[1] is equal to
min
n≥0
Vr(u
ω[n,∞), ϕ1)[1] = min
n≥0
Vr(u
ω[n,∞), ϕ1)[2] = min
0≤n<|u|
Vr((ρ(u, n))
ω, ϕ1)[2],
where the first equality is due to the induction hypothesis and the second one due to the fact that uω has
only finitely many suffixes, which are all already realized by some uω[n,∞) for 0 ≤ n < |u|.
Similarly, Vr(uω, ϕ)[2] is by definition equal to
max
m≥0
min
n≥m
Vr(u
ω[n,∞), ϕ1)[1] = max
m≥0
min
n≥m
Vr(u
ω[n,∞), ϕ1)[2] = min
0≤n<|u|
Vr((ρ(u, n))
ω, ϕ1)[2],
where the two equalities follow as before: the first by induction hypothesis and the second one by the fact that
uω has only finitely many suffixes, which all appear infinitely often in a cyclic order and which are all already
realized by some uω[n,∞) for 0 ≤ n < |u|. Thus, we have derived the desired equality between Vr(uω, ϕ)[1]
and Vr(uω, ϕ)[2]. uunionsq
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Recall that we need to prove that V mr is well-defined, i.e., that V mr (u, ϕ) ∈ B?4 for every rLTL formula ϕ and
every u ∈ Σ∗.
Proof. Let V mr (u, ϕ)[i] = 0 and j < i. By definition of V mr , we have Vr(uσ, ϕ)[i] = 0 for every σ ∈ Σω. Hence,
due to the monotonicity of the truth values from B4 used to define Vr, we obtain Vr(uσ, ϕ)[j] = 0 for every
such σ. Hence, V mr (u, ϕ)[j] = 0.
A dual argument shows that V mr (u, ϕ)[i] = 1 and j > i implies V mr (u, ϕ)[j] = 1. Combining both properties
yields V mr (u, ϕ) ∈ 0∗?∗1∗, i.e., V mr (u, ϕ) ∈ B?4. uunionsq
A.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that we need to prove that all truth values but 0011 and 0001 are realizable.
Proof. We begin by showing that 0011 and 0001 are not realizable.
First, towards a contradiction, assume there is an rLTL formula ϕ and a prefix u such that V mr (u, ϕ) = 0011,
i.e., for every extension uσ, we have Vr(uσ)[2] = 0 and Vr(uσ)[3] = 1. However, by picking σ = ∅ω we obtain
the desired contradiction to Lemma 6.1.
The proof for 0001 is similar. Assume there is an rLTL formula ϕ and a prefix u such that V mr (u, ϕ) = 0001.
Due to Lemma 2, we can assume that u is non-empty. Thus, we have Vr(uω, ϕ) = 0001 by definition of V mr ,
which contradicts Lemma 6.2.
Finally, applying Lemma 6.3, one can show that no rLTL formula without the release operator realizes 0111.
However, we show below that it is realizable by a formula with the release operator.
Next, we show that every other truth value β /∈ {0011, 0001} is indeed realizable. The witnessing pairs of
prefixes and formulas are presented in Table 1.
First, consider β = 0111 with prefix u = ∅{a} and formula ϕ = aR a. We have ltl(1, ϕ) = aR a and
ltl(2, ϕ) = a ∨ a. Note that aR a is violated by uσ, for every σ ∈ Σω. Dually, a ∨ a is satisfied
by uσ, for every σ ∈ Σω. Hence, for arbitrary σ ∈ Σω, we have Vr(uσ, ϕ)[1] = 0 and Vr(uσ, ϕ)[2] = 1. Hence,
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we have Vr(uσ, ϕ) = 0111 for every σ, as this is the only truth value that matches this pattern. Hence, by
definition, we obtain V mr (u, ϕ) = 0111.
The verification for all other truth values is based on Remark 3, which is applicable to all formulas ϕ in
the third column witnessing the realization of a truth value β 6= 0111. Now, for every such truth value β and
corresponding pair (u, ϕ), one can easily verify the following:
– If β[i] = 0, then no uσ satisfies ltl(i, ϕ).
– If β[i] = 1, then every uσ satisfies ltl(i, ϕ).
– If β[i] =?, then there are σ, σ′ such that uσ satisfies ltl(i, ϕ) and such that uσ′ violates ltl(i, ϕ). In all
such cases, σ, σ′ ∈ {∅ω, {a}ω, {a}∅ω, ∅{a}ω, ({a}∅)ω} suffice.
We leave the details of this slightly tedious, but trivial, verification to the reader. uunionsq
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2
Recall that we need to prove that u v u′ implies V mr (u, ϕ)  V mr (u′, ϕ).
Proof. Let u v u′ and assume we have V mr (u, ϕ)[i] ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, by definition, Vr(uσ, ϕ)[i] = V mr (u, ϕ)[i]
for every σ ∈ Σω. Now, as u is a prefix of u′, we can decompose u′ into u′ = uv for some v ∈ Σ∗ and every
extension u′σ′ of u′ is the extension uvσ′ of u. Hence, we have Vr(u′σ′, ϕ)[i] = Vr(uvσ′, ϕ)[i] = V mr (u, ϕ)[i]
for every σ′ ∈ Σω. Thus, V mr (u′, ϕ)[i] = V mr (u, ϕ)[i].
As this property holds for every i, we obtain V mr (u, ϕ)  V mr (u′, ϕ). uunionsq
A.6 Proof of Lemma 3
Here, we need to construct a formula ϕ and prefixes u0 @ u1 @ u2 @ u3 @ u4 such that V mr (u0, ϕ) ≺
V mr (u1, ϕ) ≺ V mr (u2, ϕ) ≺ V mr (u3, ϕ) ≺ V mr (u4, ϕ).
Proof. Consider the sequence β0, . . . , β4 with βj = 0j?4−j and note that we have βj ≺ βj+1 for every j < 4.
Furthermore, let uj = ∅j for j ∈ {0, . . . , 4}. We construct a formula ϕ such that V mr (uj , ϕ) = βj for every
j ∈ {0, . . . , 4}.
To this end, let
– ψβ1 = (a ∧ ¬ a),
– ψβ2 = (a ∧ ¬a) ∧ ¬ ¬ a, and
– ψβ3 = a ∧ ¬ a.
Later, we rely on the following fact about these formulas, which can easily be shown by applying Remark 3:
We have V mr (u, ψβj ) = βj for every prefix u.
Further, for j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, let ψj be a formula that requires the proposition a to be violated at the first j−1
positions, but to hold at the j-th position (recall that we start counting at zero), i.e., ψj =
∧
0≤j′<j
j′ ¬a∧ j a.
Here, we define the nesting of next operators as usual: 0 ξ = ξ and j+1 ξ = j ξ. By definition, we have
Vr(∅j+1σ, ψj) = 0000 for every σ ∈ Σω (†).
Now, we define
ϕ = ψ0 ∨
3∨
j=1
(
ψβj ∧ ψj
)
and claim that it has the desired properties. To this end, we note that property (†) implies Vr(∅4σ, ϕ) = 0000
for every σ ∈ Σω (††), as every disjunct of ϕ contains a conjunct of the form ψj for some j ≤ 3. Also, let us
mention that Remark 3 is applicable to ϕ.
It remains to prove V mr (uj , ϕ) = βj for every j ∈ {0, . . . , 4}.
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– For j = 0, we have u0 = ε and β0 = ????. Hence, it suffices to present σ0, σ1 ∈ Σω such that
Vr(σ0, ϕ) = 0000 and Vr(σ1, ϕ) = 1111.
Due to property (††), we can pick σ0 = ∅ω. To conclude, we pick σ1 = {a}ω, as we have
Vr(σ1, ϕ) ≥ Vr(σ1, ψ0) = Vr({a}ω, a) = 1111,
where the first inequality follows from ψ0 being a disjunct of ϕ.
– For j = 1, we have u1 = ∅ and β1 = 0???. To show V mr (u1, ϕ) = β1, it suffices to present σ0, σ1 ∈ Σω
such that Vr(u1σ0, ϕ) = 0000, Vr(u1σ1, ϕ) = 0111, and show that Vr(u1σ, ϕ)[1] = 0 for every σ ∈ Σω. For
the former task, we again pick σ0 = ∅ω due to property (††). For the latter task, using Remark 3, one can
easily verify that ltl(1, ϕ) is not satisfied by u1σ for any σ ∈ Σω, which implies the result.
To conclude, consider
Vr(u1{a}ω, ψβj ∧ ψj) = min{Vr(u1{a}ω, ψβj ), Vr(u1{a}ω, ψj)} = min{0111, 1111} = 0111,
where Vr(u1{a}ω, ψβj ) = 0111 can easily be verified using Remark 3.
– The reasoning for j = 2, 3 is along the same lines as the one for j = 1 and is left to the reader.
– For j = 4, we have u4 = ∅∅∅∅ and β4 = 0000. Hence, our claim follows directly from property (††), which
shows Vr(u4σ, ϕ) = 0000 for every σ ∈ Σω. uunionsq
A.7 Proof of Lemma 4
Recall that we need to prove that there is an rLTL formula ϕ such that for every β ∈ B?4 \ {0011, 0001} there
is a prefix uβ with V mr (uβ , ϕ) = β.
Proof. For every β ∈ B?4 \ {0011, 0001} let ϕβ be an rLTL formula and u′β be a prefix, both over {a}, with
V mr (u
′
β , ϕβ) = β. Such formulas and prefixes exist as shown in Table 1.
Now, consider the formula
ϕ =
∨
β∈B?4\{0011,0001}
aβ ∧ ϕβ
over {a} ∪ {aβ | β ∈ B?4 \ {0011, 0001}}.
By construction, we have V mr (uβ , ϕ) = β for every β, where
uβ = (u
′
β(0) ∪ {aβ})u′β(1) · · ·u′β(|u′β | − 1),
i.e, we obtain uβ from u′β by adding the proposition aβ to the first letter. Hence, ϕ has the desired properties.
uunionsq
A.8 Proof of Lemma 5
We want to show that a finite work u ∈ Σ∗ is in the language of Bϕβ iff there exists an infinite word σ ∈ Σω
with Vr(uσ, ϕ) = β for any β ∈ B4.
Proof. We show both directions separately.
From left to right: Assume u ∈ L(Bϕβ ). Moreover, let q ∈ F ?β be the final state reached by Bϕβ on an
accepting run on u (which exists since u ∈ L(Bϕβ )). By definition of F ?β , this means that L(Aϕβ (q)) 6= ∅, say
σ ∈ L(Aϕβ (q)). Since Aϕβ and Bϕβ share the same transition structures, the run of Bϕβ on u is also a run of Aϕβ
on u, which both lead to state q. Therefore, uσ ∈ L(Aϕβ ). By Theorem 2, this is equivalent to Vr(uσ, ϕ) = β.
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From right to left: Let u ∈ Σ∗ and σ ∈ Σω such that V (uσ, ϕ) = β. By Theorem 2, we have uσ ∈ L(Aϕβ ).
Consider an accepting run of Aϕβ on uσ, and let q be the state that Aϕβ reaches after reading the finite prefix
u. Since uσ ∈ L(Aϕβ ), this means that σ ∈ L(Aϕβ (q)). Thus, q ∈ F ?β because L(Aϕβ (q)) 6= ∅. Moreover, since
the run of Aϕβ on u is also a run of Bϕβ on u, the NFA Bϕβ can also reach state q after reading u. Therefore,
u ∈ L(Bϕβ ) since q ∈ F ?β . uunionsq
A.9 Proof of Theorem 3
We claim that the machineMϕ as constructed in Definition 3 is an rLTL monitor for ϕ of size 22O(|ϕ|) .
Proof. First observe that ξ indeed produces a valid value of B?4 (i.e., a truth value of the form 0∗?∗1∗). This
follows immediately from the definition of ξ and the fact that the truth values of rLTL are sequences in 0∗1∗.
Next, we observe thatMϕ reaches state (q1, q2, q3, q4, q5) after reading a word u ∈ Σ∗ if and only if for
each βj ∈ B4 the DFA Cϕβj reaches state qj after reading u. A simple induction over the length of inputs fed
toMϕ proves this.
Now, let us fix a word u ∈ Σ∗ and assume that (q1, q2, q3, q4, q5) is the state reached byMϕ after reading
u. This means that each individual DFA Cϕβj = (Q′βj , q′I,βj , δ′βj , F ′βj ) reaches state qj after reading u. Let now
B =
{
βj ∈ B4 | qj ∈ F ′βj , j ∈ {1, . . . , 5}
}
as in the definition of the output function λ ofMϕ. By applying Lemma 5, we then obtain
βj ∈ B ⇔ qj ∈ F ′βj ⇔ u ∈ L(Cϕβj )⇔ u ∈ L(B
ϕ
βj
)⇔ ∃σ ∈ Σω : Vr(uσ, ϕ) = βj .
To conclude the proof, it is left to show that ξ(B) = V mr (u, ϕ). We show this for each bit individually
using a case distinction over the elements of B? = {0, ?, 1}. So as to clutter this proof not too much, however,
we only discuss the case of ? here, while noting that the remaining two cases can be proven analogously. Thus,
let i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. Then,
ξ(B)[i] = ?⇔ ∃β, β′ ∈ B : β[i] = 0 and β′[i] = 1
⇔ ∃σ0, σ1 ∈ Σω : Vr(uσ0, ϕ)[i] = 0 and Vr(uσ1, ϕ)[i] = 1
⇔ V mr (u, ϕ)[i] = ?.
Since λ
(
(q1, q2, q3, q4, q5)
)
= ξ(B), the Moore machine Mϕ indeed outputs V mr (u, ϕ) for every word
u ∈ Σ∗. Moreover,Mϕ has 22O(|ϕ|) states because the DFAs Cϕβ = (Q′β , q′I,β , δ′β , F ′β) are of at most exponential
size in |Bϕβ |, which in turn is at most exponential in |ϕ|. In total, this proves Theorem 3. uunionsq
B Experimental Results
The evaluation is based on the original benchmark suite of Bauer et al. [13], which is in turn based on a
survey by Dwyer on frequently used software specification patterns [20]. This benchmark suite consists of
97 LTL formulas and covers a wide range of patterns, including safety, scoping, precedence, and response
patterns. For our rLTL monitor construction, we interpreted each LTL formula in the benchmark suite as an
rLTL formula (by treating every operator as a robust operator). We compared rLTL-mon to Bauer et al.’s
implementation of their LTL monitoring approach, which the authors named LTL3 tools. All experiments
were conducted on an Intel Core i5-6600 @ 3.3GHz in a virtual machine with 4GB of RAM running Ubuntu
18.04 LTS. As no monitor construction took longer than 600 s, we did not impose any time limit. Table 3 and
Table 4 summarize the results.
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Property #States #Outputs Monitorable? Time [s]
rLTL LTL rLTL LTL rLTL LTL rLTL LTL
Constrained Response-chain 2-1 3 1 2 1 3 7 2.06 0.07
Constrained 3-2 Response Chain 3 1 2 1 3 7 1.79 0.03
Constrained 3-2 Response Chain 4 1 2 1 3 7 24.21 284.53
Constrained 2-1 Response Chain 3 1 2 1 3 7 1.94 0.03
Existence 6 3 4 2 3 3 1.71 0.02
2 Bounded Existence 8 1 2 1 3 7 3.44 0.02
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 2.17 0.02
Existence 6 3 4 2 3 3 1.59 0.02
Existence 3 3 3 3 3 3 1.23 0.01
Existence 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.11 0.02
Existence 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.12 0.01
Existence 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.12 0.02
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 2.15 0.01
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 2.15 0.02
Existence 5 3 3 2 3 3 1.14 0.01
Absence 4 4 3 3 3 3 2.34 0.02
Absence 4 4 2 2 3 3 3.1 0.02
Absence 5 3 4 2 3 3 5.07 0.02
Absence 4 4 2 2 3 3 2.08 0.02
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.64 0.01
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.61 0.01
Filter=GlobalResponse->GlobalResponse 2 1 2 1 3 7 6.67 0.04
Precedence 5 3 5 3 3 3 1.35 0.01
Absence 4 2 4 2 3 3 1.53 0.03
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.34 0.02
Universal 4 2 4 2 3 3 1.67 0.02
Absence 4 4 2 2 3 3 2.12 0.03
Absence 4 4 2 2 3 3 2.1 0.03
Absence 4 4 3 3 3 3 2.67 0.86
Absence 3 3 2 2 3 3 1.74 0.01
Absence 3 3 2 2 3 3 3.2 0.42
Universal 4 2 4 2 3 3 1.44 0.01
Response 5 5 2 2 3 3 8.33 0.34
Precedence 5 3 5 3 3 3 1.5 0.01
Absence 5 3 4 2 3 3 6.3 0.02
Absence 5 3 4 2 3 3 6.59 0.02
Absence 4 4 3 3 3 3 1.44 0.02
Absence 5 3 4 2 3 3 4.17 0.02
Constrained Response-Chain (3-1) 3 1 2 1 3 7 35.4 319.74
Absence 7 4 4 2 3 3 35.57 2.11
Absence 4 4 3 3 3 3 1.42 0.01
Absence 5 3 4 2 3 3 4.04 0.02
Universal 4 2 4 2 3 3 1.38 0.02
Response 4 4 3 3 3 3 1.81 0.02
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.45 0.02
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.59 0.02
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.46 0.01
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.79 0.02
Table 3: Summary of the result when comparing the monitor construction of rLTL against LTL; continued in
Table 4
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Property #States #Outputs Monitorable? Time [s]
rLTL LTL rLTL LTL rLTL LTL rLTL LTL
Constrained Response 6 3 4 2 3 3 1.52 0.02
Absence 4 2 4 2 3 3 1.26 0.01
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.35 0.02
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.35 0.01
Unknown 8 3 4 2 3 3 2.54 0.02
Existence 2 2 2 2 3 3 0.95 0.01
Unknown 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.34 0.02
Unknown 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.31 0.01
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 550.84 2.63
Unknown 6 6 3 3 3 3 0.88 0.02
Unknown 3 3 2 2 3 3 0.95 0.02
Existence 2 2 2 2 3 3 0.85 0.01
Existence 2 1 2 1 3 7 0.88 0.02
Always 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.03 0.01
Universal 2 1 2 1 3 7 0.89 0.01
Universal 3 3 2 2 3 3 1.31 0.01
Universal 2 1 2 1 3 7 0.88 0.01
Existence 2 2 2 2 3 3 0.82 0.02
Absence 6 3 4 2 3 3 1.45 0.01
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.16 0.01
Existence 3 3 2 2 3 3 1.11 0.01
Filter=GlobalUniversal+GlobalAbsence 4 1 2 1 3 7 1.29 0.01
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.39 0.01
Universal 4 2 4 2 3 3 1.49 0.01
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.23 0.01
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.17 0.01
Response Chain 1-2 2 1 2 1 3 7 2.4 0.01
Universal 4 2 4 2 3 3 1.11 0.01
Absence 4 2 4 2 3 3 2.63 0.01
Absence 4 2 4 2 3 3 1.01 0.01
Universal 4 2 4 2 3 3 1.12 0.01
Universal 4 2 4 2 3 3 1.1 0.01
Universal 4 2 4 2 3 3 1.12 0.01
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.17 0.01
Absence 6 3 4 2 3 3 1.5 0.01
Universal 4 2 4 2 3 3 1.01 0.01
Absence 4 4 2 2 3 3 1.63 0.02
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.3 0.01
Universal 4 2 4 2 3 3 1.11 0.01
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.17 0.01
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.27 0.02
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.17 0.01
Existence 6 3 4 2 3 3 1.32 0.01
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.18 0.01
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.17 0.01
Response 2 1 2 1 3 7 1.17 0.01
Unknown 4 2 4 2 3 3 1.25 0.01
Universal 4 2 4 2 3 3 0.91 0.01
Table 4: Summary of the result when comparing the monitor construction of rLTL against LTL; continuation
of Table 3
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